The Multilateralization of International
Investment Law: Emergence of a Multilateral System of Investment Protection on
Bilateral Grounds
Stephan
W. Schill*
This
article advances the paradoxical thesis that international investment law is
developing towards a multilateral system of investment protection on the basis
of bilateral treaties. Despite the formal fragmentation of substantive
investment law in bilateral treaties, coupled with arbitration as a
decentralized dispute settlement and compliance mechanism, international
investment law does not constitute a disintegrated and unstructured body of
law. Instead, one can observe convergence rather than divergence in this field
of international law. Unlike genuinely bilateral treaties, bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) do not stand isolated in governing the relation between two States; they rather develop multiple overlaps and
structural interconnections that create a relatively uniform and
treaty-overarching legal framework for international investments based on
uniform principles with little room for insular deviation. The
article therefore argues that BITs
in their entirety function largely and increasingly analogously to a truly
multilateral system. Elements of this
thesis are the inclusion of most-favored-nation clauses, the possibilities of
treaty-shopping through corporate structuring and the functioning of
investor-State dispute settlement through the intensive use of precedent and
other genuinely multilateral approaches to treaty interpretation.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. The Potential for Fragmentation in
International Law
A. Multiplicity of
Sources, Multiplicity of Proceedings
B. Fragmentation and Arbitration as a Dispute Settlement
Mechanism
III. The Standardization of International Investment
Treaties
A. The Entrenchment of BITs in Multilateral Processes
B. Bilateralism,
Hegemony and Fragmentation
IV. Multilateralization Through Most-Favored-Nation
Clauses
A. The Multilateralization of
Substantive Investment Protection
B. The Multilateralization of Access
and Scope of Investor-State Arbitration
V. Corporate Nationality and Treaty Shopping
A. Nationality as the
Gateway to Investment Protection
B. Changing Corporate Nationality:
Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil
VI. Multilateralization Through Investment Treaty
Arbitration
A. Investment Treaty
Arbitration as a Compliance Mechanism
B. Investment Treaty Arbitration as
Investment Law-Making
VII. Multilateralization Through Interpretation and
Use of Sources
A. Interpretation in pari materia
B. The Use of Precedent
VIII.Conclusion
I. Introduction
The development of
international investment law on the basis of bilateral treaties contrasts
significantly with the emergence of multilateral institutions in other areas of
international economic law, in particular international trade and international
monetary law. While multilateralism dominated international relations in these
fields through theestablishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and later the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund,
several approaches to establish a multilateral investment treay have failed.[1]
Instead, international investment law is enshrined in currently over 2,600
bilateral, regional and sectoral investment treaties (collectively BITs).[2]
Furthermore, compliance and dispute settlement do not rely on a uniform dispute
settlement body, but make use of one-off arbitral tribunals with limited State
oversight and without institutional mechanisms to ensure consistency of the decision-making
process of the tribunals.
This development suggests a chaotic and unsystematic aggregate of the law governing
international investment relations. Rather than constituting a consistent and
coherent system of law, one would expect an extreme divergence and
fragmentation in the field. In fact, the fragmentation into bilateral treaties would make it impossible to understand this area
of law as a system of law or perceive it as part of an overarching order for
international investment relations. Instead,
differentiated, preferential and discriminatory standards should be the
expected result of bilateral treaty-making. Likewise, one would expect that
investment treaties do not establish uniform standards for the treatment of
foreign investors by national administrations, the judiciary and the
legislature. As a consequence, it would
be impossible to develop theories and doctrines of the principles governing
international investment protection.
However, what one can observe is a convergence, not a divergence
in structure, scope and content of international investment treaties. Unlike
genuine bilateral treaties, BITs do not stand isolated in governing the
relation between two States; they rather develop multiple overlaps and
structural interconnections that create a relatively uniform and
treaty-overarching regime for international investment protection. Likewise,
decisions of arbitral tribunals tend to create convergence and consistency
rather than divergence and fragmentation. Although inconsistent and conflicting
decisions as regards the interpretation of standard principles of international
investment law exist, such decisions are not only rare, but moreover largely
result from diverging views of different arbitral tribunals about the proper
application of the standard investors rights in question and are not a
function of the divergence of the underlying treaties. This article therefore
argues that BITs in their entirety function increasingly analogously to a truly
multilateral system. Instead of being prone to almost infinite fragmentation,
international investment law is developing into a uniform governing structure
for foreign investment based on uniform principles with little room for insular
deviation. Paradoxically, international investment law is therefore
multilateralizing on the basis of bilateral treaties.
To be clear, the argument is not that bilateral investment
treaties are equivalent to a multilateral treaty;
the argument is rather that the existing investment treaties, whether
bilateral, regional or sectoral, can be understood as part of a unitary
treaty-overarching legal framework that is based on largely uniform principles
of international investment law and arbitration. The argument is also not that
there is complete identity among BITs, but that there is enough convergence in
order to understand international investment law as a defined international law
discipline that provides structured legal foundations for an international
investment space as part of the global market economy on the basis of which
efficient investor-State cooperation can take place.
In order to advance this thesis, this article addresses a number
of factors which show that investment treaties and the principles of investment
protection they contain follow multilateral rationales in their conclusion and
application, even though they are enshrined in bilateral treaties. After
revisiting the potential for fragmentation in international investment law,
this note considers the harmonizing effect of most-favored-nation clauses in
investment treaties, addresses possibilities of investors to shop for the
investment treaty that best meets their needs, and, finally, discusses what
contribution investor-State dispute settlement as a compliance and dispute
settlement mechanism makes towards the progressive multilateralization of
international investment law. In particular, arbitral tribunals employ several
interpretative strategies that follow multilateral rather than bilateral
rationales and make intensive use of arbitral precedent, thus creating unity
rather than fragmentation.
II. The Potential for
Fragmentation in
International Investment Law
Many observers of international investment law stress
upon the threat, and the actual existence, of conflicting and inconsistent decisions
of investment tribunals on comparable treaty provisions or even identical
facts.[3]
They thereby echo the more general debate, which has ensued in the wake of
conflicting interpretations concerning the attribution of actions of
paramilitary groups to a State in the International Court of Justice and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, about the
proliferation of dispute settlement mechanisms as one central factor for the
fragmentation of international law.[4]
In fact, inconsistent decisions in investment treaty arbitration have occurred
with respect to several aspects of international investment protection,
including the interpretation of standard element of investment treaties such as
most-favoured-nation clauses or umbrella
clauses that accord treaty protection to investor-State contracts and
similar host State undertakings.[5]
A. Multiplicity of Sources,
Multiplicity of Proceedings
The potential for inconsistent and conflicting decisions
in investment treaty arbitration, or more generally incoherence in the law
governing international investment relations, is indeed abundant. Its causes
can be found in substantive as well as procedural law. Concerning substance,
the fragmentation of sources of international investment law suggests that
different levels of substantive investment protection exist depending on the
nationality of the investor in question. Due to the large number of BITs, the
same State measure might be assessed differently under two investment treaties.
Different treaties might also contain different standards of investment
protection, therefore resulting in differentiated protection of foreign
investors.
Similarly,
inconsistent decisions can result from the possibility of having multiple
proceedings relating to an identical set of facts. These may arise from
independent claims by shareholders at different levels of a corporate
structure.[6]
Such a constellation led, for example, to inconsistent decisions by two
tribunals in CME v. Czech Republic
and Lauder v. Czech Republic.[7]
Here, measures of the Czech Republic against a locally incorporated media
company resulted in proceedings before two investment tribunals under two
different BITs, one initiated by CME, the direct shareholder of the locally
incorporated company, the other by Mr. Lauder, the controlling shareholder of
CME. While the Tribunal in CME found
that the Respondents measures violated several provisions of the Dutch-Czech
BIT and ordered it to pay in damages of approx. US$ 270 million,[8]
the Tribunal in Lauder only found a
minor breach of the U.S.-Czech BIT, but did not award damages due to
remoteness.[9]
B. Fragmentation and Arbitration as
a Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Furthermore, the institutional design of dispute
settlement under investment treaties using one-off arbitral tribunals is a
threat to consistent decision-making. Arbitral tribunals coexist without
hierarchy and are not subject to external control mechanisms that could
effectively ensure consistency in the decision-making process of the tribunals.[10]
Furthermore, investment treaty arbitration also lacks a concept of de jure stare decisis that could operate
in producing consistent decisions.[11] On the contrary, arbitral tribunals are free to adopt rulings that deviate from
prior decisions by other tribunals.
Inconsistencies
amongst investment treaty awards can result from differing assessment of law
and facts by various tribunals. Two tribunals may, for example, agree on the
elements of necessity in international law, but disagree on whether the prevailing
circumstances actually qualify as a state of necessity. Conversely, tribunals
may disagree on the correct interpretation of the same provision in the same
BIT. The Tribunals in CMS v. Argentina
and LG&E v. Argentina, for
example, reached different conclusions in applying the U.S.‑Argentine BIT
because they assumed a different legal relationship between necessity under
customary international law and a specific emergency clause in the investment
treaty and distributed the burden of proof for certain elements of necessity
differently.[12]
Inconsistencies may also stem from conflicting views of
tribunals concerning the construction of comparable treaty provisions in
different treaties. While the Tribunal in SGS
v. Philippines, for example, accepted
that a provision in the Swiss-Philippine BIT constituted an umbrella clause and
allowed the investor to bring what were essentially contractual claims under
the BIT, the Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan denied
such an effect to a similar provision in the Swiss-Pakistani BIT.[13]
Similarly, the interpretation of the scope of MFN clauses has resulted in
diverging awards.[14]
In sum, the sources for inconsistent decisions are
numerous. The multiplicity of sources, the multiplicity of proceedings and the
significant potential for inconsistent interpretations resulting from it should
lead to a large degree of fragmentation of international investment law. In
addition, the institutional structure of investor-State dispute settlement as
one-off arbitration without significant external and internal control
mechanisms should ensure that the contracting State parties to a BIT remain in
control of the future of their bilateral treaty relations without being
affected by the operation or interpretation of unrelated third-party BITs. At the
same time, the inexistence of any hierarchy among investment tribunals and the
lack of external control mechanisms, above all a standing appeals facility,
aggravate the development of a uniform and consistent jurisprudence in the
realm of international investment law. The potential for inconsistencies in
investment treaty arbitration is therefore an expression of bilateralism in
international investment relations.
III. The
Standardization of International Investment Treaties
The bilateral form of investment treaties suggests that
the treaties differ significantly in content and structure and resemble quid pro quo bargains rather than
instruments governing international investment relations in a uniform way.
However, international investment treaties generally conform to an archetype,
converge in their wording and have developed a surprisingly uniform structure,
scope and content.[15] Almost all
investment treaties provide for national treatment, most-favored-nation
treatment, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. They
also contain prohibitions on direct and indirect expropriation and grant free
transfer of capital. Finally, most investment treaties allow investors to
initiate arbitration proceedings against the host State for violating the
treaty in question.[16] This convergence in form and content
is particularly striking as one of the reasons why ordering international
relations on a bilateral basis is preferable to multilateral ordering is the
flexibility bilateral treaties offer to respond to specific needs and
particularities.[17] This
convergence, however, as argued in this section, is not accidental, but a
result of multilateral processes behind multilateral treaty making that aim at
uniform principles of international investment law.
A. The Entrenchment of BITs in
Multilateral Processes
In
fact, the convergence of BITs is a product of international planning by
capital-exporting States. The similarities of BITs result from various
processes on the international level that embed bilateral treaties within a
multilateral framework and reflect an interest of States in establishing
uniform investment rules. First, the convergence of treaty texts of many
capital-exporting countries can be traced back to national model treaties that
serve as a basis for the negotiation of BITs. Many countries, including
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, France and
Canada, use model BITs that are updated and refined on a regular basis.[18] Although divergences between the
respective model treaty and BITs concluded on that basis occasionally occur,
there is generally a close resemblance between them.[19]
To
elaborate further, the convergence among the various national model treaties is
based on their common historic pedigree. They have not been developed
independently by different capital-exporting countries, but go back to
concerted efforts of capital-exporting countries in the 1950s and 1960s to
establish a multilateral investment treaty. In particular, the 1967 OECD Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property had, although it never
resulted in a binding instrument, a harmonizing effect for the BIT programs of
the capital-exporting countries involved and often translated directly into the
formulation of their respective model treaties.[20]
Consequently, the use of model treaties did not only serve the purpose of
facilitating negotiations about the content of a BIT and, thus, of reducing
their drafting and negotiation costs, but aimed at ensuring a certain level of
uniformity in investment treaties.
The
link between BITs and other multilateral developments can also be illustrated
by the Fourth Lom Convention concluded between EC Member States and 68
developing countries from the African, Caribbean and Pacific region. The Convention
did not only affirm the importance of concluding investment treaties between
the contracting parties,[21]
but also determined some of the content of these agreements,[22]
aiming at ensuring the homogeneity of such future treaties. The entrenchment of
BIT treaty-making in multilateral processes therefore illustrates that the
bilateral form of BITs was not a reaction to the need for flexibility regarding
the law governing international investment relations but that bilateral
treaties were merely the vehicle for implementing the multilateral aspirations
expressed in earlier multilateral projects for international investment
protection that failed to materialize because no consensus between
capital-exporting countries and capital-importing countries could be found
regarding the scope of protection of foreign investment under international
law.[23]
B. Bilateralism, Hegemony and
Fragmentation
Given
that the multilateral processes BIT treaty-making is embedded in were driven
and devised by capital-exporting countries, the content of BITs possibly could
be viewed as a function of the hegemonic behavior of those countries vis--vis their capital-importing
counterparts.[24] If this was
the case, the apparent convergence of international investment treaties would
merely conceal that BITs in fact endorse preferential benefits of stronger vis--vis weaker capital-exporting
States. In other words, it would be likely that stronger capital-exporting
States seek specific benefits in BITs in relations to competing
capital-exporters, just as States in the inter-war period have used their
negotiating power in bilateral economic relations to ensure advantages over
competing powers by concluding protectionist regimes with weaker States.[25] Thus, the apparently uniform wording
of similar treaty provisions could merely conceal differences in relative
negotiating power of the parties to the treaty and differences in the content
of the treaties concluded. The requirement to treat foreign investors fairly
and equitably, for example, could possibly afford much greater protection to
U.S. investors in Uruguay than to Dutch investors in China, given the greater
relative negotiation power of the United States.
However,
investment treaties are grounded on notions of equality and non-discrimination,
reflected above all in the principles of national and most-favored-nation
treatment, and therefore on genuinely multilateral rationales. Furthermore,
investment treaties apply the same standards to both contracting parties, that
is, to both the net capital-importing as well as the net capital-exporting
country. This aspect develops into an increasingly real restriction of the
States conduct vis--vis foreign
investors in both contracting States, with more capital not flowing only in one
direction, from the capital-exporting to the capital-importing country but in
both directions. Finally, the expanding number of South-South BITs,[26]
concluded between developing countries, where investment flows are presumably
bi-directional, equally endorse the same standard terms as those contained in
North-South BITs. This suggests that the content of investment treaties today
is generally considered as constituting an appropriate balance between
investment protection and State sovereignty, independent of whether BITs are concluded
in North-South or South-South relations.[27]
In other words, the fact that South-South BITs are not different in content
from traditional North-South BITs suggests that the content of investment
treaties is not a function of relative negotiation power between the
contracting parties, but rather an indication that the standards and principles
of international investment treaties nowadays are rather universally accepted
as appropriate standards governing investor-State relations. Certainly,
hegemonic elements were at play when developed States switched from
multilateral to bilateral negotiation settings, where they had greater relative
bargaining power.[28] Yet, this
hegemonic behavior did not result in preferential or discriminatory investment
protection standards, but rather aimed at ensuring that capital-importing
countries would agree to the same set of non-discriminatory and
non-preferential standards they would not agree on in a multilateral setting.
The
reason for the convergence of BITs, therefore, is that uniform and universal
rules are in principle in the interest of all States. The hypothesis, in this
context, is that uniform rules governing international investment relations are
not only beneficial for developed countries as a group, but are in the interest
of every single State, whether developed or developing. Such an explanation for
the convergence of investment treaties is based on the crucial role uniform
rules have for the creation of a level-playing field for foreign investment,
which in turn enables investment in a global economy to flow to wherever
capital is most effectively allocated. Uniform standards are particularly
salient as they are the prerequisite for competition in a global market. From
this point of view, establishing uniform rules is in the long-term interests of
all States and explains why bilateral investment treaties are so similar and
can be seen as a substitute for a single multilateral investment treaty.
IV. Multilateralization
Through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
The interest of States in creating uniform rules for
investment protection also surfaces in the BITs themselves. An express basis
for the multilateralization of investment relations are most-favored-nation
(MFN) clauses incorporated in almost every treaty. With some variations,
these clauses are reciprocal, unconditional and indeterminate.[29] They require to treat investments
and activities associated with investments in its own territory . . . on a
basis no less favourable than that accorded to investments and activities
associated with investments of nationals of any third country.[30]
MFN clauses break with general international law and the bilateralist rationale
that permits differential treatment of different States and their nationals.[31]
They oblige the State granting MFN treatment to extend to the beneficiary State
any more favorable treatment as may be accorded to third States[32] and thus require non-discrimination
between the beneficiary and any third State.
Although
MFN clauses constitute inter-State obligations, they extend MFN treatment
directly to covered investors in the context of investment treaties. An
investor covered by a BIT, which includes an MFN clause (the so-called basic
treaty), can therefore invoke the benefits granted to third-party nationals by
another BIT of the host State and have them applied to its relationship with
the host State. Consequently, MFN clauses multilateralize the bilateral
inter-State treaty relationships and harmonize the protection of foreign
investments in a specific host State. They prevent
States from shielding bilateral bargains from multilateralization and from
making exclusive or preferential promises to specific States and their
nationals.
A. The Multilateralization of
Substantive Investment Protection
The application of MFN clauses to import more favorable
substantive conditions from third-country BITs is largely uncontested. Several
tribunals held that MFN treatment would apply to incorporating more favorable
substantive investment protection from third-party BITs. Already in the first
known investment treaty dispute, the Tribunal in Asian Agricultural Products
v. Sri Lanka accepted the general proposition that an investor covered by
the basic treaty could rely on more favorable substantive conditions granted in
another BIT concluded with a third State.[33] The extension of substantive rights
by means of an MFN clause was also accepted in Pope & Talbot v. Canada,[34]
MTD v. Chile,[35]
and Rumeli Telekom v. Kazakhstan,[36]
and is firmly accepted in arbitral jurisprudence.
B. The Multilateralization of Access
and Scope of Investor-State Arbitration
Yet, MFN clauses, at least those that are not explicitly
limited to substantive treatment, can equally apply to investor-State
arbitration. Thus, in arbitral practice, MFN clauses have been interpreted as
encompassing more favorable conditions concerning dispute settlement mechanism
under BITs. In Maffezini v. Spain, for example, the Tribunal held that,
by means of an MFN clause, the claimant was not bound by a waiting period
contained in the basic treaty, but could rely on more favorable conditions in
Spains third-party BITs that allowed initiating investor-State arbitration
more quickly.[37]
While the application of neutrally worded MFN clauses to
questions of admissibility of investor-State claims has been rather uniformly
accepted in arbitral jurisprudence, mostly in the context of importing shorter
waiting-clauses from third-party BITs,[38] it is contentious whether MFN
clauses can also broaden the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.[39] The Tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria declined such an argument.[40] While the arbitration clause in the
basic treaty only provided for arbitration concerning the amount of
compensation for expropriation, other host State BITs provided for
comprehensive investor-State arbitration regarding all causes of action. The
Tribunal held, however, that in order to benefit from the broader consent in
subsequent BITs, the MFN clause needed to encompass investor-State dispute
settlement in a clear and unambiguous fashion.[41]
However, it is questionable whether the arguments for the
restrictive view on the scope of application of MFN clauses of the Tribunal in Plama
are convincing. The main reason for being skeptical in this respect is that the
provisions on investor-State dispute settlement are arguably the most important
rights accorded to foreign investors, because they effectively allow enforcing
compliance with the host States obligations under an international investment
treaty.[42]
It would thus be surprising if States include MFN clauses into their investment
treaties that do not encompass the most important right granted to foreign
investors under the treaties, i.e.,
the right to initiate investor-State arbitration. This is all the more so, as
equal treatment regarding access to arbitration is as important for a level
playing-field for foreign investors with different nationalities as equal
treatment regarding substantive investors rights.[43]
Furthermore, there is no principle in international law that requires a States
consent to international dispute resolution to be clear and unambiguous.
Instead, it is sufficient that consent to arbitration can be found by
interpreting the respective treaty in question and determining the existence of
consent on an objective basis.[44]
Accordingly, some more recent decisions have accepted, at least in principle,
that MFN clauses can apply to incorporating broader consent to investor-State
arbitration in third-party BITs.[45]
What remains, independent of which line of argument will
prevail in future cases, is that MFN clauses have a significant effect for the
multilateralization of bilateral investment relations. They level the
inter-State relations between the host State and various home States that have
entered into bilateral investment agreements and push the system of
international investment protection further towards multilateralism. Overall,
MFN provisions in BITs have the effect of reducing leeway for specificities in
bilateral investment relations and consequently undermine the understanding of
BITs as an expression of quid pro quo
bargains. MFN clauses thus form part of the ongoing process of a
multilateralization of international investment relations and counter, within
their scope of application, the apparent fragmentation of international
investment law by harmonizing international investment protection and
establishing a level playing-field for covered foreign investors.
V. Corporate
Nationality and Treaty-Shopping
Unlike genuine multilateral treaty regimes, the scope of
application of BITs is restricted ratione
personae to investors that have the nationality of the other contracting
Party. Inclusion into and exclusion from a treatys protection therefore depend
on the bond of nationality between the investor and its home State. This provides
a strong counterargument against the thesis that the BIT regime develops
towards a multilateral system that imposes uniform obligations upon States as
regards the treatment of foreign investments. However, investment treaties
actually allow for various forms of treaty-shopping through corporate
structuring, thus allowing investors to react to potential differences between
investment treaties of the host State. This can have a similar effect as MFN
clauses in preventing States from applying different standards of investment
protection to foreign investors depending on their nationality.
A. Nationality as the Gateway to
Investment Protection
Nationality
as the decisive factor for inclusion of a specific investor in and exclusion
from the protection offered by a specific BIT is becoming an increasingly
elusive criterion as States have difficulties in limiting the protection a
specific BITs offers to a specific bilateral inter-State relationship. The
reason for this mainly is the broad definition in most BITs of the notion of
investor, which regularly does not only comprise natural persons,[46]
but also corporate investors. While the nationality of natural persons is
relatively stable and not subject to frequent change, corporate entities can
change their nationality quickly and at little cost by migrating to another
jurisdiction or by setting up a corporate subsidiary abroad. This effectively
allows investors to change their nationality for purposes of investment
protection by hiding behind the corporate veil and by structuring their
investment so that they are covered by the investment treaty they prefer. This
involves a large potential for treaty shopping, and undermines an
understanding of BITs as expressions of bilateral bargains, because an investor
can easily opt into almost any BIT regime it wishes. The interplay between
investment protection, corporate law and corporate structuring thus has a
profound influence on the multilateralization of international investment law.
Above all, arbitral tribunals so far have declined to
take a look behind the corporate veil in order to determine the nationality of
corporate investors according to the nationality of its shareholders; what is
relevant instead is either the place of incorporation or the corporate sige social.[47]
Arbitral tribunals have thus accepted to view corporate vehicles as investors
and have accorded them protection under their home State BIT, even though the
controlling shareholders might be covered by a different investment treaty with
the host State, or even no investment treaty at all.
B. Changing Corporate Nationality:
Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil
Arbitral
jurisprudence has accepted such treaty‑shopping in a number of different
situations. In Aguas del Tunari v.
Bolivia, the Tribunal accepted that an
investment that was originally not protected by an investment treaty, because
the investors home State had not entered into a BIT with the host State, could
be brought under BIT protection by changing the corporate structure and interposing
an entity that was covered by an investment treaty.[48] Likewise, arbitral jurisprudence has
accepted that dual nationals, who also have the nationality of the host State,
can hide behind the corporate veil of a company incorporated in the State of their
other nationality. In Champion Trading v. Egypt, the Tribunal accepted that dual
U.S.-Egyptian nationals, who were themselves denied standing under Art.
25(2)(a) ICSID Convention, could bring claims against Egypt by structuring
their investment through a company incorporated in the United States.[49]
Finally, in Tokios Tokels v. Ukraine
the Tribunal even accepted that nationals of the host State could, by means of
corporate structuring, hide behind a corporate structure incorporated in
another jurisdiction and thus bring their investment under the protection of
the BIT between their home State and the companys home State.[50] While the Respondent argued that
find[ing] jurisdiction in the case would be tantamount to allowing Ukrainian
nationals to pursue international arbitration against their own government,[51]
the Tribunals majority concluded that the definition of investor in the BIT
also comprised constellations of reinvestments as the one in the case at hand.[52]
Some
treaties, however, restrict the possibilities of investors to use corporate
vehicles in a third-country jurisdiction to opt into a different BIT regime by
employing so-called denial of benefits‑ clauses that allow the host
State to deny investment treaty protection to those investors that have merely
opted into the treaty regime in question through the establishment of a shell
or mailbox corporation.[53]
The U.S.‑Georgian BIT, for instance, provides that:
Each Party reserves the right to deny to a company
of the other Party the benefits of this Treaty if nationals of a third country
own or control the company and ... the company has no substantial business
activities in the territory of the Party under whose laws it is constituted or
organized.[54]
Such
denial of benefits provisions thus recognize that corporate entities can be
used as vehicles to bring an investment under the applicability ratione personae of a third-country BIT.
They aim at preventing such corporate structuring for purposes of investment
treaty protection in case the corporate vehicle has no business activities in
the jurisdiction of incorporation and thus no genuine link to this
jurisdiction. At the same time, denial of benefits-clauses are also a clear
illustration that States are aware of the possibility of investors to channel
their investments through third-country corporations in order to benefit from
the protection of a specific investment treaty. The clauses therefore confirm
that in their absence corporate structuring can be used by investor for
treaty-shopping.
The
possibility of corporate structuring shows above all that ordering
international investment relations on a truly bilateral basis with rights and
benefits only accruing to nationals of one specific home State is an
increasingly illusionary undertaking, since the nationality of corporate
investors has become as fungible as capital in global markets. Corporate
structuring, therefore, multilateralizes investment treaties because virtually
any investor from virtually any country is capable of opting into virtually any
BIT regime. Similarly, access and exit from the BIT regime resembles a
multilateral treaty regime if corporate structuring is taken into account.
Thus, access to investment protection in a specific host State can become
operative through a single BIT. Concluding a single BIT, in other words, could
potentially offer investment protection to all foreign investors in the host
State concerned, provided the BIT in question encompasses corporate structures
without taking into account the shareholders behind them. Conversely, corporate
structuring restricts selective exits from investment protection in relations
to specific States. Instead, effective exit from international investment
protection is only possible if a host State terminates all of its investment
treaties as investors can always bring their investment under the protection of
a different BIT simply by restructuring through a corporate intermediary
covered by a different BIT.
In sum,
multi-jurisdictional structuring therefore shows that bilateralism as an
ordering paradigm for international investment relations is unfeasible, because
investors can often opt for the BIT regime they prefer. Although the
possibility of treaty-shopping per se suggests that there are relevant
differences between investment treaties, treaty shopping also shows that a
treaty-overarching regime or system of international investment law develops
independently of the actual uniformity in content of bilateral investment
treaties and independent from the inclusion of most-favored-nation clauses.
Rather, by accepting corporate structuring, BITs provide investors themselves
with a tool to multilateralize international investment protection.
VI. Multilateralization
Through Investment Treaty Arbitration
The
multilateralization of international investment law does not only take place on
the level of substantive investment protection. It is also furthered by the
introduction of investor-State arbitration as a mechanism for settling disputes
under BITs. By granting investors the right to initiate arbitration and thus
force host States to comply with the treaties, leeway for inter‑State
negotiations about the consequences of breaches of BITs after a dispute has
arisen is virtually abolished. This excludes bilateral post-breach bargaining
and ensures that investment treaties are enforced independent of the relative
power relations between host and home States. Apart from its compliance
function, investor-State arbitration also empowers tribunals to function as
law-makers for the entire investment treaty regime.
A. Investment Treaty Arbitration as
a Compliance Mechanism
Traditional
international law allowed States to flexibly negotiate around the consequences
of breaches of international obligations, if this was in their interest and was
achievable in view of their bargaining power.[55]
Inevitably, this flexibility could lead to contortions in the competition
between investors depending on their national origin. Access to investor-State
arbitration, by contrast, ensures that investors are able to enforce investment
treaties against States independently of their home States relative power.[56]
This does not only consolidate international investment law as a functioning
legal regime, but also ensures that the general and uniform principles that
investment treaties establish are implemented without contortions in the
enforcement stage. Investor-State arbitration as a dispute settlement and
compliance mechanism thus restricts bilateralism in the enforcement of
investment treaty obligations by removing the power of States to defect from
their treaty obligations based on bargaining with the investors home State.
Furthermore, the ICSID Convention excludes the exercise of diplomatic
protection by the investors home State, thus ensuring that investor-State
arbitration remains the only mechanism to settle disputes about compliance of
the host State with its treaty obligations.[57]
The establishment of investor-State arbitration, in other words, is part of the
development to resolve investment-related disputes in a judicial forum and by
legal means, rather than by inter-State bargaining and diplomatic pressure.
In
addition to that, the ICSID Convention, which governs most investment treaty
disputes,[58]
itself constitutes a multilateral convention. Consequently, it subjects
investor-State disputes, independent of the governing investment treaty, to the
same procedural rules and imposes equal transactions costs regarding the
settlement of investment treaty disputes. Furthermore, the rules in the ICSID
Convention concerning the recognition and enforcement of investment treaty
awards respond to the necessity of implementing an arbitral award effectively
across several jurisdictions. It provides for the recognition of arbitral
awards in all Member States of the ICSID Convention and thereby transforms the
effect of an award rendered pursuant to the rules of a specific BIT into a
specific obligation that has to be complied with by all Member States of the
Convention.[59]
This makes it more difficult for respondent States to frustrate the enforcement
of arbitral awards in its own territory by enabling investors to enforce it
against assets the host States holds in third States, for example bank
accounts. By automatically recognizing ICSID awards as final and binding in all
Member States jurisdictions, the ICSID Convention thus elevates the enforcement
of awards from the bilateral to the multilateral level.
Both
procedural aspects add to the idea that investment treaties are part of the
legal framework for a global economy that is based on market mechanisms and
equal competition among investors from different home States and that enables
investments to flow to wherever capital is allocated most efficiently.
Multilateral rules for investment arbitration and enforcement respond to this
objective by creating a level playing-field for the settlement of disputes and
the enforcement of investment treaty obligations.
B. Investment Treaty Arbitration as
Investment Law-Making
Investor-State arbitration, however, not only contributes
to the multilateralization of international investment law because it functions
as a compliance mechanism, but also because it helps to generate
treaty-overarching norms governing investor-State relations.[60]
This norm-generative function is based on two factors: the institutional
structure of investment treaty arbitration and the vagueness of the substantive
provisions of investment treaties.
Investor
rights such as fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security,
indirect expropriation or national treatment leave a wide margin of discretion
to arbitral tribunals in determining the normative content of those principles
and in applying them to the specific facts of a case. In fact, these principles
of international investment protection can rather be understood as general
clauses that delegate substantial rule-making powers to decision-making
bodies.[61]
As a consequence, arbitral tribunals emerge as important law-makers in
international investment law when transforming the broad principles of international
investment law into more precise rules that affect the executive, the
legislative and the judiciary of the host State in their activities.[62]
The
power‑shift from States to tribunals becomes all the more visible in view
of the restrictive possibilities that States have in influencing the direction
of investment jurisprudence. Restricted possibilities in influencing the
appointment of arbitrators, the arbitral process and the enforcement of
arbitral awards leave only limited leeway to counterbalance the authority that
investment tribunals exercise. Similarly, the power to react to what States
might perceive as mistaken jurisprudential developments through the
modification of treaties is limited, as treaty adjustments require the consent
of all States concerned.
Investor-State
arbitration and the law-making function arbitral tribunals assume, however,
does not need to be seen as a threat to State sovereignty; the norm-generative
function of investment arbitration also adds to the multilateralization of international
investment law and helps to resolve uncertainty about the vagueness of many
standard investor rights. The function of arbitral tribunals to generate norms
and fill gaps in investment treaties in fact enables States to enter into
long-lasting and stable investment relations that are not obstructed by
continuous bilateral bargaining every time the broad principles have to be
concretized for specific areas of State conduct. Investor-State arbitration
thereby responds to the need to solve uncertainty and ambiguity in
international investment relations, to stabilize them over time, and to adapt
them to changing realities.[63]
Most notably, the function of concretizing investment law and generating new
law is not limited to a specific investment treaty that governs a dispute
submitted to arbitration, but affects the interpretation of investment treaties
in general. How arbitral tribunals contribute to generating a
treaty-overarching framework of international investment protection shall be
evident in the next section.
VII. Multilateralization
Through Interpretation and
Use of Sources
Tendencies towards a multilateralization of international
investment law are visible in the practice of arbitral tribunals, above all in
the way they interpret and construe investment treaties. Most notably,
tribunals do not interpret and construe BITs according to methods
characteristic for the interpretation of bilateral treaties, but employ
rationales that suggest the existence of a treaty-overarching body of international
investment law that has merely found its expression in bilateral treaties.
Namely, the frequent use of references to prior arbitral awards and third-party
investment treaties is significant in this respect. In doing so, investment
tribunals translate the similarities of bilateral treaties into a multilateral
reality.
A. Interpretation in
pari materia
Departing
from a strict bilateral focus in interpreting BITs, arbitral tribunals
frequently make use of cross-treaty interpretation or interpretation in pari materia, i. e. reference to third-party treaties that are not binding
upon the parties involved in an investment dispute in order to interpret and
apply the governing treaty.[64]
This has the effect of creating uniformity in the treaty interpretation of
different BITs by embedding bilateral treaties in a treaty-overarching
framework. Even though third-party treaties do not become sources of law
strictly speaking, they nevertheless inform the interpretation of the governing
treaty. This has a multilateralizing effect as the strict emphasis on the
bilateral relationship in treaty interpretation is abandoned. Instead,
investment treaties are treated as if they emanate from a single source and
enshrine a body of investment law principles that is applicable rather
independently from the governing treaty.
The validity of this method of interpretation for BITs
was recognized in the first known investment treaty arbitration in Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka where the Tribunal
considered it proper to consider
stipulations of earlier or later treaties in relation to subjects similar to
those treated in the treaty under consideration.[65]
Subsequently, this approach played a role in numerous other arbitral decisions.
In Maffezini v. Spain, for example,
the Tribunal took into account the general BIT practice of the
contracting State parties in interpreting the MFN clause in question.[66]
In Plama v. Bulgaria, the Tribunal
drew an argumentum e contrario from
third-country treaties in order to support a narrow interpretation of an MFN
clause. Similarly, many other cases of interpretation in pari materia can be observed.[67] This suggests that arbitral
tribunals perceive that investment treaty practice of States in general forms
part of the relevant sources of international investment law, which accordingly
can be used for guidance in interpreting a specific investment treaty.
B. The
Use of Precedent
The second important aspect suggesting that arbitral
tribunals are actively engaged in producing and reproducing a treaty-overarching
framework for international investment protection is the extensive use arbitral
tribunals make of precedent. Far from constituting a subsidiary source of
international law as envisaged by Art. 38(1)(d) ICJ-Statute, precedent has
become both quantitatively as well as qualitatively the premier determinant for
the outcome of investor-State disputes. Even though arbitral precedent is
considered to be non-binding, it has a considerable de facto force in shaping the uniform interpretation of BITs.
Notably, even in cases of conflicting and inconsistent arbitral decisions,
tribunals employ various interpretative strategies to uphold consistency in
investment treaty arbitration and unity of international investment law. These
strategies include the distinction of cases based on differences in the
underlying facts and differences in the wording of the BITs in question,[68]
simply concealing dissent with earlier arbitral decisions[69]
and reconciling seemingly conflicting decisions based on conflict rules, such
as the relation between principles and exceptions.[70]
System-consistency is thus clearly a concern that influences and drives
investment treaty jurisprudence despite the existence of a myriad number of
BITs. Comparable to the use of cross-treaty interpretation, the use of
precedent reinforces the view that international investment law is based on a
uniform order that overarches individual bilateral treaties. It also creates
intra-system communication and consistency and secures that differences in
jurisprudence are addressed and dealt with. Again, inconsistent decisions
exist, but they are not so pervasive as to invalidate the observation that the
jurisprudence of investment tribunals is predominantly consistent.
References
to ICSID decisions can be found in nearly all of the more recent ICSID
decisions on jurisdiction and awards on the merits. A recent quantitative
citation analysis, for example, concluded that citations to supposedly
subsidiary sources, such as judicial decisions, including arbitral awards,
predominate.[71] Although
tribunals regularly emphasize the non-binding nature of precedent, they
nevertheless primarily turn to earlier decisions for guidance.[72]
The Tribunal in El Paso v. Argentina,
for example, stated that it would follow the same line [as earlier awards],
especially since both parties, in their written pleadings and oral arguments,
have heavily relied on precedent.[73] The way the parties to disputes rely
on precedent, suggests the emergence of expectations that tribunals will decide
cases not by abstractly interpreting the governing BIT, but by embedding
interpretation and reasoning into the preexisting discursive structure as it is
shaped by prior investment treaty awards.[74]
The material influence of precedent becomes apparent, for
example, in the NAFTA award in Waste Management v. Mexico, where the
Tribunal extensively described earlier investment awards regarding fair and
equitable treatment in order to extrapolate a case-sensitive definition of this
standard. The importance of precedent is ever more imposing, as the Tribunal
did not critically analyze earlier decisions and their arguments, but merely
endorsed their holdings, similar in style to the common law system of stare decisis. The Tribunal thus defined
the standard of fair and equitable treatment by recurring to earlier NAFTA
decisions. It observed:
Taken
together, the S.D. Myers, Mondev, ADF and Loewen cases
suggest that the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment
is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant
if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is
discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or
involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial
propriety – as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural
justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candour
in an administrative process.[75]
Thus, what primarily mattered
for the Tribunal in the application of fair and equitable treatment was the
application of the facts of the case to a standard developed from earlier NAFTA
decisions, not one developed by independent interpretation of the treaty text
itself.[76]
Such a use of precedent is characteristic for arbitral tribunals and can be
traced with respect to virtually all standards of investment protection.
The
contribution that investment jurisprudence makes towards a multilateralization
of international investment law is most apparent when juxtaposing the emerging
common law of investment arbitration with the traditional view of the effects
of bilateral treaties and bilateralist methods of treaty interpretation. From a
bilateralist perspective, making use of precedent in cross-treaty cases and
referring to third-party treaties as an interpretative aid would be seen as a
violation of the inter partes effect
of international treaties, since the third-party treaty is indirectly accorded
normative weight. Clearly, if third-party treaties are used as an
interpretative aid, this can amount to either creating new or reducing existing
obligations under investment treaties. Likewise, the extensive reliance on
precedent could be seen as a violation of the traditional doctrine of sources
of international law, because precedent in international investment arbitration
is not merely applied as a subsidiary source of international law, but
constitutes the primary normative framework in the decision-making of arbitral
tribunals. Notwithstanding the above, the heavy use of precedent can be
reconciled with the principles of treaty interpretation, if one considers that
the regime established by the entirety of more than 2,600 BITs either
reproduces customary international law,[77]
or forms part, as a treaty-based multilateral system, of any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties in the sense
of Art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In other
words, the heavy use of precedent, as well as other forms of treaty interpretation
that are characteristic for a multilateral system, can be reconciled with
traditional concepts of the law of sources and treaty interpretation if one
assumes that BITs are merely the form a treaty-overarching, multilateral system
of international investment protection has taken.
VIII. Conclusion
Most international treaties order the relations between
two States only. They create mutual rights and obligations and coordinate State
behavior on a bilateral basis. While allowing for flexible solutions depending
on the specific situation and interests of the States involved, bilateralism
inhibits the emergence of the legal foundations for an international community.
It puts the State, its sovereignty and its consent to the creation of
international law center stage and secures the precedence of State interests
over interests outside or beyond its realm. This fortification of the State
coined the traditional understanding of international law as it developed
throughout the 19th and most of the 20th century. It
characterized its doctrine of sources by strictly focusing on State consent, it
denied international law subjectivity to non-State actors, and de facto linked the enforcement of
international law in a non-hierarchical order to a favorable distribution of power.[78]
Multilateralism,
by contrast, assumes the existence and legitimacy of interests of an
international community beyond the interests of States. It orders inter-State
relations on the basis of general principles that establish a general framework
for the interactions among States and their citizens. It aspires towards
universal validity and application and views States as being embedded within
the structure of an international community. Following World War II,
multilateralism as an ordering paradigm for international relations became
increasingly important in a number of fields, in particular international human
rights, international security and international trade. It left a significant
imprint on the structure and nature of international law by recognizing the
limitations of State sovereignty in view of interests and values of an
international community. The recognition of jus
cogens, the development of international criminal law, or the increasing
importance of humanitarian interventions, are just a few examples that
illustrate this development.
Typically,
multilateralism is implemented on the basis of multilateral treaties that serve as the vehicle par
excellence of community interest.[79]
They base relations of States on general non-discriminatory principles and
thereby create legal institutions around which the expectations and conduct of
States and their citizens can evolve. However, multilateralism can also develop and be implemented on the basis of bilateral
treaties. In the realm of international investment protection, bilateral rather
than multilateral treaties are creating the institutions necessary for the
development and stabilization of a global economy. Similar to multilateral
treaties, BITs order international investment relations on the basis of general
principles that are relatively uniform across the myriad number of bilateral
treaty relationships. They do not constitute quid pro quo bargains, but establish a uniform legal framework that
stabilizes and structures the economic activity of foreign investors and
requires host States to conform their behavior to rule of law standards,
thereby enabling market forces to unfold.
Along these lines, this article has
argued that international investment law is evolving towards a multilateral system
of investment protection based on bilateral treaties. This understanding has an
impact on practical questions of BIT interpretation that should conform to
multilateral rather than bilateral rationales and provides a justification for
the heavy use of precedent. More importantly, however, the understanding of
investment protection as a multilateral system forms the basis for other
theoretical projects concerning the function of investment treaties in a global
economy. It is the precondition for understanding the BIT regime as a uniform
body (or system) of law and, thus, forms the theoretic basis for projects
embedding investment treaties into the global administrative law project[80]
or advancing the thesis that international investment law is in a process of
evolving constitutionalization.[81]
* Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg; Rechtsanwalt and Attorney-at-Law (New York); LL.M. in European and International Economic Law (Universitt Augsburg, 2002); LL.M. International Legal Studies (New York University, 2006); Dr. iur. (Johann Wolfgang Goethe‑Universitt Frankfurt am Main, 2008). The present article draws from the authors Ph.D. thesis, which was published as Stephan Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (2009). E-mail: schill[at]web.de. The usual disclaimer applies.
[1] See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A
Brief History of International Investment Agreements,
12 U. C. Davis J. Intl L. &
Poly 157 (2005) (hereinafter Vandevelde); Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The
Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 Fordham Intl L. J. 275 (2000).
[2] See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International
Investment Agreements (2008-June 2009), IIA Monitor No.3, at p. 2 (2009), available at: www.unctad.org/en/docs//webdiaeia20098_en.pdf
(last visited March 31, 2010) (recording an aggregate of 2,676 bilateral
investment treaties by the end of 2008).
[3] See Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions,
73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 (2005).
[4] Pemmaraju
Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums, 25 Mich. J. Intl L. 929, 956‑957
(2004). See further Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law (2007).
[5] Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of
International Investment Law 339-355 (2009) (hereinafter Schill).
[6]
This results from the broad definition of investor and investment which
accords standing to shareholders at various levels. See Christoph Schreuer, Shareholder Protection in International Investment
Law, in Common Values in International Law, Essays in
Honour of Christian Tomuschat 601 (Dupuy/Fassbender/Shaw/Sommermann
eds., 2006).
[7] See Wolfgang Kahn, How to Avoid Conflicting Awards
– The Lauder and CME Cases, 5 J. World Inv. & Trade 7 (2004).
[8] CME
Czech Republic B.V (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 121 (Sep. 13, 2001)
Final Award of March 14, 2003 [all investment treaty awards are available via
the Investment Treaty Arbitration website at http://ita.law.uvic.ca
or the Investment Claims website at http//www.invstmentclaims.com].
[9] Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award of Sept. 3,
2001, at para. 235.
[10] See Aron Broches, Observations on the Finality
of ICSID Awards, 6 ICSID
Rev.–Foreign InvestmentL. J. 321 (1991). The exclusive remedy
against ICSID awards is annulment pursuant to Article 52 of the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (ICSID Convention), adopted March 18, 1965, entered into force Oct. 14,
1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, which can be based on enumerated grounds. Lack of
consistency or conflicts with earlier arbitral jurisprudence is not a ground for
annulment. See M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New Turbine Inc.
v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Decision on Annulment
(Oct. 19, 2009), at para. 24 (observing that [t]he responsibility for ensuring
consistency in the jurisprudence and for building a coherent body of law rests
primarily with the investment tribunals). Recognition and enforcement of
non-ICSID awards are regularly subject to proceedings before domestic courts
pursuant to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done at New York on 10 June 1958 (New York Convention), 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
While the Convention grants greater powers to domestic courts than the ICSID
Convention, inconsistencies in arbitral jurisprudence alone are regularly not
grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.
[11] See only art. 1136(1) NAFTA; Art. 53(1)
ICSID Convention (both providing for the binding effect of awards between the
parties to the proceeding only). Investment tribunals accept the
lack of a rule of de iure stare decisis,
see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kőhler, Arbitral
Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23
Arb. Intl 357 (2007) (hereinafter
Kaufmann-Kőhler).
[12] See Stephan Schill, International
Investment Law and the Host States Power to Handle Economic Crises,
24 J. Intl Arb. 265 (2007).
[13] See, for example, Judith Gill et al., Contractual Claims and Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 21 J. Intl Arb. 397
(2004).
[14] See, for example, Faya Rodriguez, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in
International Investment Agreements, 25 J.
Intl Arb. 89 (2008). See also
Schill, supra note 5, at 151-173.
[15] See
for an older empirical study Mohamed I. Khalil, Treatment of Foreign Investment in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 7
ICSID Rev.–Foreign Investment L. J.
339 (1992).
[16] For
general accounts of investment treaties and investment treaty arbitration see Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete
Stevens, Bilateral Investment
Treaties (Kluwer
International 1995)(hereinafter Dolzer
& Stevens); M. Sornarajah, The
International Law of Foreign Investment 315 et seq. (2d ed. 2004); Campbell McLachlan,
Laurence Shore & Matthew Weiniger,
International
Investment Arbitration – Substantive Principles (Oxforf
International Arbitration Series 2007) (hereinafter McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger); Andreas
F. Lowenfeld,
International
Economic Law 467–591 (2008); Rudolf
Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of
International Investment Law (2008) (hereinafter Dolzer & Schreuer); The Oxford Handbook
of International Investment Law (Muchlinski/Ortino/Schreuer eds.,
2008) (hereinafter Muchlinski/Ortino/Schreuer eds.); Andrew Newcombe &
Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties – Standards of Investment
Protection (2009).
[17] See generally on the variables that explain the
institutional choice between bilateralism and multilateralism, T. Rixen &
I. Rohlfing, The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in
International Trade and Taxation ,12 Intl
Negotiation 389 (2007).
[18] Various model BITs, including the ones of Austria,
China, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United
States, and the United Kingdom, are reprinted in Dolzer
& Stevens, supra note 16, at 165 et seq.; McLachlan, Shore
& Weiniger, supra note 16, at 379 et seq.; Dolzer &
Schreuer, supra note 16, at 352 et seq.
[19] See
Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 170.
[20] See, for example, Anthony Sinclair,
The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the
International Law of Investment Protection, 20 Arb. Intl 411 (2004) (concerning the development of
umbrella clauses).
[21] See art. 260(1) of the Fourth ACP-EEC
Convention (Lom Convention, signed Dec. 15, 1989), 29 I.L.M. 809 (1990).
[22] Annex LIII of the Final Act concerning the Lom
Convention, 29 I.L.M. 802 (1990).
[23] See Schill,
supra note 5, at 31-40.
[24] In this sense B.S. Chimni, International
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 Eur. J. Intl L. 1, 7 et seq. (2004).
[25] See
Charles P. Kindleberger, Commercial Policy Between the Wars, in The
Cambridge Economic History of Europe 161 (Vol. VIII) (Mathias &
Pollard eds., 1989).
[26] UNCTAD,
South-South
Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20053_en.pdf
(last visited March 31, 2010).
[27] Stephan
Schill, Tearing Down
the Great Wall – The New Generation Investment Treaties of the Peoples
Republic of China, 15 Cardozo J.
Intl & Comp. L. 73, 114 et
seq. (2007).
[28] Eyal
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empires New Clothes:
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law,
60 Stan. L. Rev. 595, 611‑612
(2007).
[29] See Pia Acconci, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, in
Muchlinski/Ortino/Schreuer eds., supra note
16, at 363, 368.
[30] Art. 3(c) of
the Agreement between the
Government of Australia and the Government of the People's Republic of China on
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, signed and entered
into force July 11, 1988.
[31] Endre Ustor, Most-Favoured-Nation Clause,
in Encyclopedia
of Public International Law 468 (Vol. III) (Bernhardt &
Macalister-Smith eds., 1997).
[32] See
id. at 468.
[33] Asian Agricultural Products
Ltd v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
Award of June 27, 1990, para. 54 (hereinafter Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka).
[34] Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA,
Award on the Merits of Phase 2 of April 10, 2001,
para. 117. See also Pope & Talbot
v. Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award of May 31, 2002, para. 12.
[35] MTD
Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile,
ICSID Case. No. ARB/01/7, Award of May 25, 2004, paras. 100 et seq., 197 et seq.
[36] See
Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic
of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award of July 29, 2008, paras. 572,
575, 609‑619.
[37] Emilio Agustn Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision
of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of
Jan. 25, 2000,
paras. 38 (hereinafter Maffezini v. Spain).
[38] See AWG Group Ltd. v The
Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3, 2006, para.
52; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. (AGBAR) and Vivendi
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision
on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3, 2006, paras. 52 et
seq. (hereinafter Suez and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina);
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.
(AGBAR) and Interaguas Servicios Integrales del Agua, S.A. v. The Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on
Jurisdiction of May 16, 2006, para. 52; Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. The Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary
Questions on Jurisdiction of June 17, 2005, paras. 24 et seq. (hereinafter Gas Natural
v. Argentina); Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3,
2004, paras. 32 et seq.; Camuzzi
International S.A. v. The Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2, Decision
on Objections to Jurisdiction of May 11, 2005, para. 121; National Grid
PLC v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction of June 20,
2006, paras. 53 et seq. So far, only
the Tribunal in Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award of Dec. 8, 2008, (hereinafter Wintershall v. Argentina) disagreed with
the result in Maffezini and its
progeny that waiting periods could be shortened based on an MFN clause (see id., paras. 158-197).
However, the Tribunal in Wintershall qualified
the requirement to pursue local remedies for eighteen months before turning to
international arbitration as a jurisdictional condition to the host States
consent to arbitration, rather than as an admissibility-related question (see id., paras. 108-157). For
this reason, it applied the reasoning and the rationale of Plama v. Bulgaria.
See infra notes 40‑41 and accompanying text.
[39] See
on this debate with further references Stephan Schill, Most-Favored-Nation Clauses as a Basis of
Jurisdiction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 10 J.
World Inv. & Trade 189 (2009).
[40] See Plama Consortium Ltd. v.
Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction of Feb. 8,
2005, para. 183 et seq
(hereinafter Plama
v. Bulgaria).
[41] Id.,
para. 200; see also id., para. 218. Likewise, Salini
Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction of Nov. 15 2004, paras. 102
et seq.(hereinafter Salini v. Jordan); Vladimir Berschader and Mose Berschader v. The
Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award of April 21, 2006, paras. 159‑208;
Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v.
The Republic of Hungary, ISCID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award of Sept 13, 2006,
paras. 81 et seq.; Wintershall v. Argentina, supra note 38,
paras. 167, 187‑189.
[42] Cf. Gas
Natural v. Argentina, supra note 38, para. 49. See on this and the
following also Schill, supra note
5, at 173-193.
[43] Schill, supra note 5, at 180-182.
[44] Id.,
at 184-187.
[45] RosInvestCo
UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V 079/2005, Award on
Jurisdiction of Oct. 2007, paras. 124‑139 (finding that the MFN clause in
question in connection with broader consent given by Respondent in a
third-country BIT extended the Tribunals jurisdiction); Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v.
The Russian Federation, SCC No. 24/2007, Award on Preliminary
Objections of March 20, 2009, paras. 68‑120 (declining to extend
jurisdiction based on the MFN clause in question because, in the majoritys
reading, the clause did not cover questions of dispute settlement, but
agree[ing] that more favourable may in principle include accessibility to
international fora, id., para. 119
– the Separate Opinion on the case concluded that the MFN clause in
question would extend the Tribunals jurisdiction in light of more favorable
consent in the host States third-country BITs).
[46] International law does, however, require that a
sufficiently genuine link between the individual and the State granting
nationality exists in order for the foreign nationality to be recognized by
other countries. See Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v.
Guatemala), Judgment of April 6, 1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955, pp. 4, 20 et seq.
[47] Using the control theory, by contrast, which determines corporate
nationality according to the nationality of the controlling shareholders, is
rather exceptional. See Dolzer
& Stevens, supra
note 16, at 34 et seq.; Anthony Sinclair,
The Substance of Nationality Requirements
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 20 ICSID-Rev.‑Foreign
Investment. L. J. 357, 368‑378 (2005) (hereinafter Sinclair
– Substance of Nationality
Requirements).
[48] Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondents Objections to Jurisdiction of Oct.
21, 2005, paras. 67 et seq.
(hereinafter Aguas
del Tunari v. Bolivia); See also Saluka
Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of March
17, 2006, paras. 222‑242; ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC
Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal of Oct. 2, 2006, paras. 335‑362.
[49] See
Champion Trading Company Ameritrade
International, Inc., James T. Wahba, John B. Wahba and Timothy T. Wahba v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/9, Decision on
Jurisdiction of Oct.
21, 2003, paras. 3.4.1 et seq.
[50] Tokios Tokels v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction of April 29,
2004, paras. 21 et seq (hereinafter Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine). See
on the case also Markus Burgstaller, Nationality
of Corporate Investors and International Claims against the Investors Own
State, 7 J. World Inv. & Trade 857 (2006).
[51] Tokios Tokeles v.
Ukraine, supra note
50, para. 22. A somewhat
different approach was taken in TSA
Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award of Dec. 19, 2008, paras. 133–162,
where the Tribunal declined jurisdiction because of lack of a company
under foreign control in the sense of art. 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention
in case of a locally incorporated company that was owned, via an intermediary corporate
entity incorporated in the Netherlands, by an Argentine national. While the
Tribunal supported piercing the corporate veil in the case at hand, the
decision is arguably limited to the specific jurisdictional requirements of
art. 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention and does not concern the determination of
nationality of corporate investors under investment treaties and,
thus, does not take a negative stance against corporate structuring in more
general terms. See Schill, supra note 5, at 232-234.
[52] Id., para. 36. Similarly,
Wena Hotels Limited. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on Jurisdiction of June 29,
1999, 41 I.L.M. 881, 886‑889 (2002);
The Rompetrol Group N.V. and Romania, ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of April
18, 2008, paras. 75‑110.
[53] On such clauses see
Sinclair – Substance of Nationality
Requirements, supra note 47, at
378‑387; See also Plama v. Bulgaria, supra note 40, paras. 143‑170
(attributing, however, to denial of benefits-clauses the questionable content
of only allowing host States to deny benefits of the investment treaty
protection prospectively after the invocation of the clause, instead of
handling it properly as an objection to jurisdiction or admissibility of the
claim).
[54] Art. XII Treaty between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Georgia concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed March 7, 1994,
entered into force Aug. 10, 1999. Art. 17(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty (annex I of
the Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference),
adopted Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 373 (1995), contains a similar denial of
benefits clause.
[55] See, for example,
the practice of lump-sum agreements in settling claims for the violation of
alien property Richard B. Lillich &
Burns H. Weston, International Claims: Their Settlement by Lump-Sum Agreements (1975); Burns H. Weston, David J.
Bederman, Richard B. Lillich, International
Claims: Their Settlement by Lump-Sum Agreements 1975-1995 (1999).
[56] Cf. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards
a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes – The Role of ICSID and
MIGA, 1 ICSID
Rev.–Foreign Investment L. J. 1 (1986). On
investor-State arbitration as a compliance mechanism see Stephan Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective
Compliance: Cost-Shifting in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
7 J. World Inv. & Trade 653, 681 ‑ 683 (2006).
[57] See art, 27 ICSID Convention.
[58] UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No. 1 (2008), at p. 2, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20083_en.pdf (last
visited March 31, 2010).
[59] See
art. 54 ICSID Convention.
[60] See Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of
Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International Law, 3(5) Transnatl
Disp. Mgmt (2006).
[61] Cf. Gunther Teubner, Standards und Direktiven in Generalklauseln:
Mglichkeiten und Grenzen der empirischen Sozialforschung bei der Przisierung
der Gute-Sitte-Klauseln im Privatrecht 60 et seq. (1971); Critical on the delegation of such
law-making functions to tribunals Matthew C. Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27
U. Pa. J. Intl Econ. L. 79
(2006).
[62] See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan
Schill, Investor-State
Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality, and
the Emerging Global Administrative Law, IILJ Working Paper 2009/6 (Global Administrative Law Series), pp. 1-2, available at: http://www.iilj.org/publications/2009-6Kingsbury-Schill.asp (last visited March 31, 2010).
[63] See Schill,
supra note 5, at 261-263.
[64] Id.
[65] Asian
Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka, supra note 33, para. 40.
[66] Maffezini v. Spain, supra note 37, paras. 52
et seq.
[67] See further Compaia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment of July 3, 2002,
para. 55; Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, supra note 48, paras. 289‑314.; Suez and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, supra
note 38, para. 58; L.E.S.I.–DIPENTA v. Rpublique algrienne dmocratique et
populaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Award of Jan. 10, 2005, para. 25(ii); Salini v. Jordan, supra note 41,
para. 116; Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, supra
note 50, paras. 34 et seq.; International
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Arbitral Award of Jan. 26, 2006, Separate Opinion by Prof. Wlde, para. 106 (hereinafter Thunderbird
Gaming v. Mexico).
[68] Salini
v. Jordan, supra note 41, paras. 102
et seq.
[69] See, for example, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp.,
LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision
on Liability of Oct. 3, 2006 (where the tribunal repeatedly cited CMS v. Argentina in support of its
interpretation of fair and equitable treatment or the application of the
umbrella clause, id., paras. 125,
128, 171, but failed to mention that that decision reached a contrary result
concerning the necessity defense, id.,
paras. 204‑266).
[70] Plama
v. Bulgaria, supra note 40, paras. 217 et seq.
[71] Jeffery P.
Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration – A Citation Analysis
of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24
J. Intl Arb. 129, 148 (2007).
[72] See also Kaufmann-Kőhler, supra note 11.
[73] El
Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction
of April 27, 2006, para. 39. See also AES
Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of April 26, 2005, para. 18.
[74] Cf. on the emergence of expectations in
the reference to, application of and justified departure from precedent Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Appellate Body Report of Oct. 4, 1996, at p. 14; See also Saipem S.p.A. v. The
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation
on Provisional Measures of March 21, 2007, para. 67; Thunderbird
Gaming v. Mexico,(supra note
677, paras. 16, 129‑130.
[75] Waste
Management, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3
(NAFTA), Award of Apr. 30, 2004, para. 98.
[76] Id., paras. 99 et seq.
[77] See, for example, Steffen Hindelang, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate – The
Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary International Law Revisited,
5 J. World Inv. & Trade 789
(2004).
[78] Bruno Simma, From
Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 Recueil des Cours 217, 230 et seq. (1994).
[79] Id.,
at 323.
[80] Cf. Gus
Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species
of Global Administrative Law, 17 Eur. J. Intl L. 121 (2006).
[81] See
David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the Rule of Law, 8 Constellations 521, 523 et seq. (2001); Peter Behrens, Towards
the Constitutionalization of
International Investment Protection, 45 Archiv
des Vlkerrechts 153 (2007).
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